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The Space Between: Negotiating the Contours of Nodal 
Security Governance through ‘Safer Communities’ in Bosnia-
Herzegovina1 
 
In this article, I analyse three months of ethnographic field work 
conducted with the United Nations Development Programme’s ‘Safer 
Communities’ project in Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH) in 2011 using an 
analytical framework grounded in Lendvai and Stubbs’ (2007) work on 
‘policy translation’. This framework suggests that the spaces which 
exist between different ‘security nodes’ (Johnston and Shearing 2003) 
such as ‘Safer Communities’ can be analysed as ‘contact zones’ (Pratt 
1991) where different actors and interests converge to shape the 
contours of security governance in transitional, post-conflict societies. 
Analysing ‘Safer Communities’ as a ‘contact zone’ provides insight into 
the power politics of the project and to the important role that capital 
and nodal proximity play in determining the translational capacities of 
different stakeholders. My analysis of this case study affirms the 
significant influence of supranational institutions like the European 
Commission and their ability to draw upon substantial economic capital 
to align the outputs of local security nodes from a distance. It also 
presents a nuanced account of networked security governance in 
which multi-lateral institutions like UNDP can draw upon their nodal 
proximity and limited capital to mediate pressures for structural 
alignment. This latter finding is promising because it highlights a ‘nodal 
solution’ to the question of ‘how nodal relations could be transformed 
to improve governance processes and outcomes for weak actors’ 
(Wood and Shearing 2007: 98) in structurally weak and dependent 
societies like BiH. 
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Introduction 
This article generates a fresh sociological perspective on the relationship 
between liberal state-building, security governance and policing reforms in 
transitional, post-conflict societies. This is achieved through an ethnographic 
case study which examines the United Nations Development Programme’s 
‘Safer Communities’ project (SCP) as an important ‘contact zone’ in Bosnia-
Herzegovina (BiH).2 This analytical approach builds upon Johnston and 
Shearing’s (2003) work on nodal security governance by positing that contact 
zones describe important spaces that link security nodes thus constituting a 
nodal security network and supplying these nodes with meaning. Contact 
zones denote the convergence of various actors and interests working, either 
actively or passively, to assert their preferences over the conceptual and 
programmatic contours of mantras and policies associated with security 
governance and policing reforms in weak and structurally dependent 
societies. With reference to recent literature that focuses on structural and 
post-structural critiques of the problematic relationship between liberal state-
building projects and policing reform initiatives (Bowling and Sheptycki 2012; 
Ellison and Pino 2012; Ryan 2011),  I examine the power politics of the 
‘Safer Communities’ project to highlight the potentially coercive and 
undemocratic influence of non-core development aid structures on policy 
prescriptions that affect the work of mediatory and localised security nodes. 
Of particular concern was the tendency for the SCP team to attempt to align 
the project with locally perceived interests of powerful supranational donors, 
in this instance the European Commission, rendering this translational 
process largely inaccessible to domestic policy makers and practitioners.   
I conclude this case study with a review of more recent developments 
in the Safer Communities project that support a more nuanced account of the 
structural relationship between liberal state-building and security governance 
in BiH. The fact that the SCP team was ultimately capable of devising a 
creative solution to their funding dilemma by attempting to recast the project 
as a component of the UN’s ‘Armed Conflict and Violence Prevention 
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Programme’ illustrates the capacity of local manifestations of multi-lateral 
development agencies like UNDP in BiH to function as ‘policy translators’. 
This example therefore demonstrates how seemingly disempowered 
stakeholders can potentially mitigate the coercive effects of powerful 
structural pressures for alignment pursue a capacity building mandate that 
‘improve[s] governance processes and outcomes for weak actors’ (Wood 
and Shearing 2007: 98).  
The space between: contact zones in nodal models of governance 
Johnston and Shearing (2003) propose that nodal governance provides an 
important conceptual framework for accounting for the interplay of different 
actors, institutions and collectives in governing security. They argue that the 
combined effects of neo-liberalisation and globalisation have effectively 
created plural policing landscapes in many societies as the responsibility for 
the governance of security has effectively become ‘embedded’ within all 
aspects of governance resulting in a diverse network of interconnected 
security nodes (Ibid.: 26) While states continue to play a ‘predominant’ role in 
steering these networks domestically, Johnston and Shearing add that in 
practice governance is often ‘negotiated’ (Ibid.: 27) so the ‘nodal cartography’ 
of security governance in post-modern societies has become increasingly 
responsive to private interests. Accordingly, they argue that  the ‘governance 
of security is increasingly oriented around risk, anticipation and prevention’ 
and therefore serves to generate ‘power inequalities’ as opposed to ‘just and 
democratic outcomes’ which reflect the public interest in security (Ibid.: 160). 
Applying this framework to elaborate on the sociological relationship between 
liberal state-building, security governance and policing reform processes in a 
transitional post-conflict society like Bosnia-Herzegovina is therefore 
desirable given the plethora of transnational actors and institutions involved 
with the policing reform process, the limited role of the state in ‘steering’ 
these reforms’ and the extent to which a plurality of governing actors emulate 
the nodular character of governance that Johnston and Shearing associate 
with a post-modern society. 
Johnston and Shearing (2003: 22) suggest that the negotiated 
character of governance is significant because it serves to generate order, 
that is, ‘a set of explicit or implicit normative prescriptions or rules about the 
way things ought to be’. Thus, mapping the contours of a nodal security 
network promises to illuminate the power politics of security governance 
within a given society. In other words, this exercise serves to address the 
important question of ‘who has the capacity and authority to make rules?’ 
  
Illuminating the ‘nodal cartography’ of post-modern security governance 
requires more than just the study of specific security nodes. Rather, 
Johnston and Shearing suggest that it must focus on the networked relations 
between these nodes in order to determine what compels them to govern 
security in certain ways and to what effect (Ibid.:146-147). I argue that the 
concepts of ‘policy translation’ (Lendvai and Stubbs 2007) and ‘contact 
zones’ (Pratt 1991) provide important frameworks for analysing the power 
politics which define the spaces between different security nodes.  
The conceptual development of policy translation is attributable to 
Lendvai and Stubbs (2007) who draw upon actor-network-theory or the 
‘sociology of translation’ to address a deficiency in the mainstream literature 
on policy transfer: a linear and deterministic view of the policymaking 
process.  Drawing on Latour (2005: 39), the conceptual distinction between 
‘policy transfer’ and ‘policy translation’ is apparent in the roles of ‘mediator’ 
and ‘intermediary’.  Whereas an intermediary ‘transports meaning or force 
without transformation’, ‘[m]ediators transform, translate, distort and modify 
the meaning or the elements that they are supposed to carry’ with the effect 
that ‘[t]heir input is never a good predictor of their output’ (Latour 2005: 39). 
Mediators represent active participants in a process of transformation while 
intermediaries merely serve to transmit policies between contexts. 
Translation therefore implies that ‘...a series of interesting, and sometimes 
even surprising disturbances can occur in the spaces between the 'creation', 
the 'transmission' and the 'interpretation' or 'reception' of policy meanings’ 
(Lendvai and Stubbs 2007). 
 Borrowing from Pratt (1991), Lendvai and Stubbs (2007: 6) describe 
these spaces as ‘contact zones’.  According to Pratt (1991: 6), ‘contact 
zones’ describe ‘…the spatial and temporal co-presence of subjects 
previously separated by geographic and historic disjunctures, and whose 
trajectories now intersect’ (quoted in Lendvai and Stubbs 2007: 15). These 
contact zones are important social sites where different actors interact and 
compete to shape policy meaning and content in relation to their individual 
and institutional preferences (Lendvai and Stubbs 2007: 16). Contact zones 
are actively constructed ‘through actor networks’ and therefore, they do not 
represent ‘pre-existing categories’ (Lendvai and Stubbs 2006: 6). In other 
words, they suggest that a contact zone represents a shared space in which 
various stakeholders seek to translate their institutional preferences into 
policy prescriptions and ultimately, policy outputs and outcomes. 
Actors in the political space constituted by a contact zone utilise 
different forms of capital in order to advance their own preferences within a 
  
shared system.3 Accordingly, ‘[i]n the 'contact zone' encounters are rarely, or 
rarely only, about words and their meaning but are almost always, more or 
less explicitly, about claims-making, opportunities, strategic choices and 
goals, interests and resource maximisation...’ (original emphasis Lendvai and 
Stubbs 2007:  16).’ By drawing on institutional resources which include 
various types of capital (e.g. economic, political, social), participants compete 
to shape the language and prescriptions for policies to reflect their own 
interests and agenda. The process of channelling their institutional agenda 
through a universally appealing framework affords these participants a 
symbolic mark of legitimacy that serves to authenticate the institutional or 
political motives underpinning the proposed measures. This is process of 
legitimation is therefore translational and produces a mediating effect 
whereby ‘some kinds of association or translation are legitimated and 
authorised just as others are excluded or denied’ (Freeman 2009: 435).  
Applying these concepts to a meso-level analysis of policing reforms 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina complements existing structural critiques of the 
relationship between liberal state-building and police reforms in weak and 
structurally dependent societies (eg. Ellison and Pino 2012; Ryan 2011). 
Contact zones offer a valuable framework for analysing the politicised 
character of relationships between security nodes while the nodular 
approach advocated by Johnston and Shearing (2003) allows us to analyse 
these ‘spaces’ as part of a wider networks of governance. In the section 
which follows, a brief review of the literatures on global policing and 
externally-driven police reforms in BiH contextualise my case study and 
elaborate on the value of drawing on the concepts of policy translation and 
contact zones to produce an empirically-grounded account of the nuanced 
power relations that generate security governance in this transitional, post-
conflict society.  
Liberal state-building and policing reforms in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
 
Structural and post-structural analyses of the relationship between state-
building, security governance and policing reform processes typically reflect 
elements of Duffield’s (1999; 2007) critique of the relationship between 
development and security in the aftermath of the Cold War which suggests 
that the primary driver for development aid, humanitarian interventions, and 
liberal state-building initiatives since the early 1990s is a broadened, liberal 
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definition of security that emphasises the ‘biopolitical’ threat of 
underdevelopment as a proxy for conflict. Empirical critiques of policing 
reforms and the actors that pursue them in the context of weak and 
structurally dependent societies suggest that their prescriptions generally 
reflect the interests of powerful international actors who use their influence 
and capital to generate alignment and convergence (Bowling 2010; Bowling 
and Sheptycki 2012;  Ryan 2011).4 With reference to the prescriptive 
normative literature on ‘democratic policing’ (Bayley 2006; Jones et al. 1996; 
Stone 2000), the evident implication of these critiques is that the policing 
practices and structures generated by foreign assistance programmes lack 
clear channels of democratic accountability and responsiveness to the 
interests of domestic stakeholders (Aitchison and Blaustein 2012; Marenin 
2000; Ellison and Pino 2012).  
Building on this observed lack of local ownership and participation in 
policing reform projects that affect developing, transitional and post-conflict 
societies, these critiques have also generated practical concerns about the 
sustainability of the outputs that these prescriptions for policing reform 
generate (see Pino and Wiatrowski 2006). This is particularly evident in 
relation to research that documents the gap between community policing 
rhetoric and practices in developing and transitional countries around the 
world (Brogden 1999; see also Brogden and Nijhar 2005).  Brogden’s work 
suggests that reformers involved with community policing reforms in these 
contexts are prone to overestimating the transferability of these policies and 
often fail to consult with local stakeholders with respect to questions of 
design and implementation with the implication that the outputs that they 
generate are often underwhelming and in some cases, undesirable (Ruteree 
and Pommerolle 2003).  
With reference to the ongoing police reform process in BiH, a 
prototypical example of liberal state-building (see Chandler 1999), the 
question of local ownership (or lack thereof)5 and concerns about the outputs 
generated by policing reforms have been primarily voiced with reference to 
the activities of international interests represented by the Office for the High 
Representative (OHR) and the European Union Police Mission (EUPM).6 For 
example, Collantes Celador (2007, 2009) questions the suitability of 
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statebuilding and governance in Bosnia-Herzegovina (see Belloni 2001; Caplan 2005; 
Pugh 2002) 
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 For an overview of criminal justice transformations in Bosnia-Herzegovina including the 
police reforms between 1995 and 2005, see Aitchison (2011). Collantes Celador (2007, 
2009) provides a detailed account of the activities of the EUPM. 
  
‘European police standards/practices’ in relation to the complex and 
fragmented political landscape of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the politicisation 
of the police reform process itself in relation to an EU-centred agenda that 
prioritises harmonisation and alignment over developing local ownership and 
sustainability. Similarly, Juncos (2011) criticises the coercive tactics utilised 
by the OHR in attempting to promote its Europeanization agenda during 
attempts at police restructuring. Aitchison (2011: 81-105) also voices 
concerns about the extent to which international policing reformers in Bosnia-
Herzegovina continue to focus on state security apparatuses despite the 
apparent limitations of this approach due to the institutional deficiencies of 
the police in this context. 7 
The philosophy of community policing was first introduced to Bosnia-
Herzegovina by the United Nations International Police Task Force (IPTF) 
with support from the US International Criminal Investigative Assistance 
Program (ICITAP) during the late 1990s. The EUPM would subsequently 
initiate some community policing projects between 2003 and 2005, much of 
which were oriented towards improving local security for ‘returnee’ 
populations as well as improving the general public’s trust in the police 
(Collantes Celador 2007: 16). Since the mid-2000’s, the EUPM has 
substantially trimmed its involvement with low visibility aspects of the policing 
reform process such as community policing (see Collantes Celador 2009: 
240). Accordingly, since 2005 seemingly all of the major projects relating to 
the local governance or delivery of policing have been initiated by a handful 
of bi-lateral and multi-lateral development agencies including the UK 
Department for International Development (DFID), the Swiss Agency for 
Development Cooperation (SDC), the Sarajevo-based Centre for Security 
Studies (CSS) in partnership with the London-based Saferworld Group, and 
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established the Office of the High Representative ‘the final authority in theatre 
regarding interpretation of this Agreement on the civilian implementation of the 
peace settlement’ (United Nations Security Council 2010). Further information about 
the complex political and policing architecture of Bosnia-Herzegovina can be found in 
Aitchison (2011: 44-60).  
  
most recently, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP).8 Much 
of their work has focused on introducing specific models of ‘community 
policing’ and ‘community safety partnership’ projects (including ‘Safer 
Communities’) at various sites throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to 
improve the accountability and responsiveness of local security providers, 
including the police and other municipal officials, to their respective 
communities.  
Advocating a mix of meso- and micro-level reforms, these initiatives 
reflect a human security narrative that presents community policing and 
community safety partnerships as complementary elements of a ‘holistic’ 
localised strategy for generating meaningful improvements in policing and 
security.9 The work of these agencies is documented within the existing 
literature on policing reforms in BiH10  however analysing one of these 
projects as a contact zone promises to illuminate the ‘micro-politics’ (Van de 
Spuy 2000) which shapes its contours and prescriptions.  In other words, this 
analytical approach promises generate detailed descriptions of what it is that 
compels multi-lateral development agencies like the UNDP to translate 
vague and ubiquitous concepts like ‘Safer Communities’ into conceptual and 
programmatic prescriptions for security governance. This highlights an 
important gap in the literature on policing reforms in BiH and other weak and 
structurally dependent societies, one with substantial implications for our 
understanding of the nodal cartography of security governance in these 
contexts.   
 Safer Communities in Bosnia-Herzegovina   
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 Examples of this narrative can be found in a 2007 UNDP Albania report which reviews 
activities in Bosnia-Herzegovina (DeBlieck 2007).  I elaborate on this posited 
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Investigative Assistance Program (ICITAP) played in contributing to the development 
of early training courses on community policing (Vejnovic and Lalic 2005) and later 
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in Bosnia-Herzegovina’ (Collantes Celador 2007, 2009). Also, Deljkic and Lučić‐Ćatić 
(2011) provide an empirical evaluation of community policing practices in Sarajevo 
that reviews the work DFID and the SDC in managing pilot projects however their 
analysis primarily focuses on the question of effectiveness.  
  
Policies associated with community safety partnerships including ‘Safer 
Communities’ and ‘Safer Cities’ have proliferated globally over the past two 
decades. As an increasingly prominent feature of plural policing and crime 
control strategies in advanced ‘Western’ societies, their touted successes 
and their purported contribution to generating more accessible and 
responsive models for local security governance have rendered these 
policies attractive templates for reformers involved with policing issues in 
developing, transitional and post-conflict societies. Their global dissemination 
through transnational policy communities, policy entrepreneurs and 
international development agencies and non-governmental organisations 
since the mid-1990s suggests that significant cross-national (and even 
intrastate) variation exists with regards to the conceptual and programmatic 
features of these ‘partnerships’ (Crawford 2009).  The hybrid nature of 
community safety partnerships in developing, transitional and post-conflict 
societies is particularly evident as they are transplanted in these contexts 
meaning that their contours are adapted to fit local circumstances and 
structures (Dupont et al 2003: 341).  
In Bosnia-Herzegovina, community safety partnerships were 
introduced between 2003 and 2006 by the UK's Department for International 
Development (DFiD) and the Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation 
(SDC) which established citizen security forums (CSF)11 to complement their 
community policing projects. The logic was that community policing would 
serve to improve the public’s willingness to engage with the police while 
establishing local security forums (henceforth ‘citizen security forums’ or 
‘CSF’) would generate greater cooperation between the police and their 
counterparts amongst other local public service providers thereby improving 
the capacity of these officers to address community problems through 
partnership (Atos KPMG 2003: 3-4). While the SDC concluded its 
involvement with community safety reforms after the national Strategy for 
Community-based Policing in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina Ministry of Security 2007) was published in 2007, DFID 
continued to provide support for the CSFs that it piloted in Priijedor and 
Žepče until 2010.  Beginning in 2006, the Sarajevo-based Centre for Security 
Studies (CSS) in cooperation with the UK-based Saferworld Group was also 
involved with piloting various community safety partnership projects locally 
throughout BiH. By April 2010, both the Saferworld Group and the CSS had 
decided to discontinue the project however a consensus remained amongst 
many of the individuals and organisations involved with policing reforms in 
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BiH that ‘community safety partnerships’ were needed throughout the 
country in order to sustain the progress made with community policing and to 
develop locally accountable sites of security governance (Field notes, 26 
April 2010).  
*UNDP  ((Safer Communities)) CSFs* 
 
The goal of improving cooperation between the police and other municipal 
service providers with a role to play in community safety and local security 
governance served as the working narrative for the Safer Communities 
project during its pilot phase which officially commenced in early 2009. The 
project’s initial aims included supporting five previously established ‘citizen 
security forums’ (CSF) in Bratunac, Prijedor, Sanski Most, Visegrád and 
Zenica while drawing on their diverse experiences to develop a strategic 
framework that would allow the SCP team to support the project’s expansion 
throughout BiH with financial support (i.e. non-core funding) from European 
donors (Interview, ‘Project Manager’, 26 April 2010; UNDP  2010).With 
reference to the work of Johnston and Shearing (2003), it is evident that 
UNDP aspired to develop a parallel architecture for nodal security 
governance  in BiH, one that could enhance existing state structures and 
institutions by improving the links between different agencies and security 
actors and rendering their governance more accessible and responsive to 
the needs and interests of local security consumers (UNDP 2009a).  
It is evident that during the pilot phase, each CSF would constitute an 
important security node. UNDP would also serve as an important security 
node in this emerging network as this organisation served as the institutional 
sponsor for Safer Communities and provided this project with seed funding 
that allowed the Safer Communities project team to provide financial and 
technical support to these forums. With this seed funding, it was also evident 
that Safer Communities emerged as an important contact zone in this 
emerging network as it actively linked these CSFs to other security nodes 
including multinational institutions like UNDP and later the European 
Commission.12 The remainder of this subsection introduces the micro-politics 
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of the SCP as a contact zone by reviewing its methodology for selecting 
these pilot municipalities and for identifying relevant project activities to 
implement through their forums. This analysis concludes that the SCP team’s 
mentality was consistent with UNDP’s ‘local capacity development’ mandate 
with the implication that domestic stakeholders, specifically local political 
elites involved with these CSFs, were encouraged to take ownership over 
their respective  nodes and to use them to govern security in a locally 
responsive manner. I 
UNDP’s Safer Communities project was originally established as a 
component of the Programme’s Small Arms Control and Reduction project in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (SACBiH). However, the SACBiH team was unable 
to initiate the Safer Communities component because it lacked the funding 
and thus the personnel to do so. In late 2009, the team secured seed funding 
and between April and June 2010, the team’s Project Manager and 
Community Policing Advisor (henceforth ‘CP Advisor’) conducted a series of 
meetings with various stakeholders throughout BiH that were previously or 
currently involved with different aspects of community policing and 
community safety partnership reform projects. Upon completing this 
research, UNDP published a ‘Baseline Assessment’ report which reviewed 
the team’s pilot selection methodology and also presented evidence in 
support of the project. With reference to the selection methodology, the 
report suggests that team developed a set of criteria that would determine 
whether individual municipalities qualified for pilot status. The most essential 
positive selection factor was that a given municipality already had an 
established and functional CSF (UNDP 2010: 11).  
Another consideration that factored heavily into the team’s selection 
process was motivation (Interview, ‘Project Manager’ and ‘CP Advisor’, 26 
April 2010). Essentially, the newly formed SCP team was only keen to invest 
its limited resources into supporting CSF’s that would be cooperative and 
receptive to UNDP’s offer of assistance. This was due to the limited 
timeframe for the pilot phase of the project and the need for the SCP to 
demonstrate results in order to attract future investment and ultimately 
expand the project. The team’s emphasis on ‘motivation’ as informal criteria 
for selecting pilot candidates suggests that it was keen to promote 
partnership and cooperation as symbolic values to define its working 
methodology. This was perhaps unsurprising given that this mentality was 
consistent with what the team identified as the institutional mandate of 
UNDP: local capacity development (Personal field notes, 21-22 February 
2011).  
From the perspective of the SCP team, UNDP’s capacity development 
ethos enabled its members to distinguish their ‘progressive’ approach from 
  
what it perceived to be the ‘top-down’ and ‘coercive’ methods utilised in the 
past by other international organisations involved with policing reforms in 
BiH. For example, the Project Manager would frequently comment that the 
SCP was not about forcing a specific model or structure upon these local 
actors. Rather, the idea was that UNDP would provide technical and financial 
support to CSFs and invest in project activities that reflected the local 
security needs of their respective communities. It was believed that this initial 
investment would help to promote the work of these CSFs, both locally and 
throughout BiH thereby generating ‘grass roots’ demand for additional CSFs 
to be established in other municipalities throughout the country. Locally, it 
was also projected that the carrot of financial investment to support project 
activities would encourage participation and cooperation between different 
municipal agencies and political elites keen to access this source of 
economic capital (Personal interview, ‘Project Manager’, 26 April 2010).  
Based on this description, it is clear that the team’s understanding of Safer 
Communities as a template for pursuing local capacity development was 
influenced by an important institutional narrative long associated with UNDP 
in its role as a development organisation (Murphy 2006).13 
Once the five pilot sites had been selected, it was also evident that the 
implementation methodology of the ‘Safer Communities’ team during its pilot 
phase would generally reflect the capacity development mandate. This was 
evident from the range of project activities that UNDP supported through 
these forums in 2011 and its rationale for doing so. To identify public safety 
and security issues of relevance to local communities throughout Bosnia-
Herzegovina, the team commissioned a public perceptions survey in late 
2010 which revealed that the number one source of insecurity for many 
Bosniak (Bosnian Muslim) communities involved the country’s stray dog 
population. For Bosnian Serb communities, the predominant issue seemed 
to involve road traffic while in Bosnian Croat communities, there appeared to 
be higher levels of concern about the availability of narcotics (UNDP, 
‘internal document’, 2010).14 
Initially, these findings came as a surprise to the Safer Communities 
team because they appeared to contradict the project’s justification by 
suggesting that the levels of victimisation and the public’s fear of crime were 
actually rather low in Bosnia-Herzegovina. From UNDP’s perspective, this 
positive assessment of the country’s local security situation was also a 
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 These are now largely spatially distinct communities which suggests a shift away from the 
more integrated pre-war landscape. 
  
source of concern because it raised further questions about whether the 
team would eventually be able to convey the importance of the project to 
potential donors and thus pursue its projected expansion given that the pilot 
phase was scheduled to expire at the end of 2011 (Personal communication, 
Sarajevo, 17 January 2011).15  Despite its concerns about the appeal of 
focusing on such low profile activities, the Safer Communities team met with 
the different CSF’s and presented these findings in order to determine the 
project activities that their local ‘partners’ wished to pursue. For example, the 
Safer Communities team would go on to support Zenica’s CSF in designing 
and constructing a shelter for stray dogs and later Bratunać’s CSF in 
developing architectural designs for an upgrade of its youth sport facilities. In 
the months that followed, the team also worked with CSFs to introduce 
CCTV technology and to ensure that its use and applications were consistent 
with a charter for the ‘democratic use’ of this technology published by the 
European Forum for Urban Security (Personal communication, ‘Safer 
Communities team’, 13 December 2011). 
The SCP’s decision to support these project activities illustrates 
UNDP’s significant influence over the power politics of this setting as this 
seed funding dictated the managerial and accountability structures for the 
project. This economic capital therefore afforded the SCP team a significant 
degree of autonomy in terms of how it conceptualised the project and defined 
its projected outputs meaning that the SCP team was encouraged to support 
project activities that reflected the local security needs of BiH citizens.  In this 
respect, the projected outputs for the pilot phase of Safer Communities were 
largely intangible and intentionally vague. For example, while the SCP was 
formally established through the SACBiH project document (UNDP 2009a), 
the posited value of community policing and community safety partnerships 
as strategies for reducing personal ownership of illegal small arms played no 
discernable role in determining the types of activities that the team would 
pursue through these CSFs. In fact, not once was the issue of small arms 
reduction breached at any of the meetings that I attended between 
representatives of the SCP and the pilot CSFs. On a rhetorical level, it was 
also evident that the Project Manager would only publicly acknowledge the 
link between small-arms control and Safer Communities when discussing the 
project with certain audiences that had a limited role to play in shaping the 
actual implementation of the project (Field notes, January–March 2011).16  
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 The pilot phase would subsequently be extended until mid-2012 as the team continued to 
pursue additional funding streams. 
16
 One example of this was at a quarterly Project Board meeting for the SACBiH project in 
February 2011. During the meeting, the Project Manager spent the majority of her/his 
  
In this case, UNDP’s economic capital also translated into social 
capital. UNDP’s seed funding meant that Safer Communities would be 
designed, managed and implemented by UNDP employees. While each 
member of the SCP team was classified as ‘local staff’ meaning that they 
were BiH citizens on temporary contracts with UNDP, these individuals 
believed in the organisational ethos of capacity development and this was 
evident through their work. Furthermore, the lack of conditionality attached to 
this seed funding meant that senior managers in the UNDP BiH country 
office were not overly concerned with the SCP team’s ‘performance’ or 
‘results’ but rather their ability to use the project to attract non-core 
investment.  This meant there was no immediate need for the team to pre-
define its policy prescriptions during the pilot phase. Most importantly, this 
stream of economic capital meant that domestic stakeholders in BiH, 
specifically members of the pilot CSFs, were afforded opportunities to shape 
the contours of the project by defining relevant project activities and altering 
the structure of these forums to accommodate the diverse political and 
contextual features of their respective communities.  The flexible and 
indeterminate character of this project was therefore considered to be an 
important asset by the SCP team given its desire to generate outputs that 
would help to improve the governing capacities of local political elites and 
practitioners throughout BiH. To this effect, one member of the team 
suggested that the SCP represented a ‘perfect metaphor for the work of 
UNDP’ because ‘it can be used to do anything but it is difficult to define’ 
(Personal communication, ‘Safer Communities team’, 17 February 2011).17  
*European Commission   ((Safer Communities)) CSFs* 
 
Elaborating on the perceived need for the Safer Communities project to 
eventually appeal to the interests of the European Commission as a 
prospective investor highlights some important issues about the (un-
)democratic character of this this contact zone and its responsiveness to 
hierarchical pressures for structural alignment. While the ambiguity 
surrounding the conceptual and programmatic contours of Safer 
Communities was viewed by the SCP team and UNDP as an asset insofar 
                                                                                                                                          
presentation reviewing the SACBiH team’s progress with regards to various targets for 
munitions destruction and made only a brief reference to the ‘Safer Communities’ 
component by stating that it was ‘linked with weapons collection activities’ (Personal 
field notes, 04 February 2011). 
17
 This description is consistent with Browne’s (2011) analysis of the weak and ill-defined 
mandate of UNDP. 
  
as it allowed the project to focus on capacity development, it was also 
evident that the lack of clarity regarding what the Safer Communities was 
meant to achieve in BiH would be problematic down the line because it 
would not appeal to prospective donors interested in projects that promised 
to deliver tangible benefits and outputs (Personal communication, ‘Project 
Manager’, 17 January 2011). As a project dealing with security sector reform 
in the Western Balkans, it was also believed that the European Commission 
represented the only remaining source potential investment as most 
alternative sources of bi-lateral assistance had dried up by this point. 
Confronted with a need to attract a new source of revenue to sustain the 
SCP beyond 2011, a significant portion of my time in this contact zone was 
spent working with colleagues to negotiate and translate the conceptual and 
programmatic contours of Safer Communities into language that would 
resonate with the European Commission.  
Articulating a new identity for the project proved to be challenging 
because none of the team members (including myself) possessed a concrete 
understanding how the process of attracting non-core investment from 
donors actually worked. Furthermore, there was also confusion about what 
kind of policing reform projects the European Commission would be keen to 
invest in. One restriction we faced was that the three permanent members of 
the Safer Communities team were BiH citizens and lacked first-hand 
experience and knowledge of the higher echelons of the UN development 
system and the international community’s network of governance in BiH.18 As 
junior staff in the UNDP BiH country office, the team’s CP Advisor and 
Project Associate lacked the social capital necessary for directly acquiring 
this information from senior UNDP managers who understood the ‘donor 
game’. While the Project Manager (also a BiH citizen) did possess this social 
capital, this individual was frequently preoccupied with addressing various 
obstacles that had arisen with the SACBiH project meaning that the CP 
Advisor, the Project Associate, and I were left to explore these questions 
through regular brainstorming sessions that generated various concept notes 
and prescriptions for transforming the project. These concept notes would 
ultimately play only a limited role in determining how the SCP would actually 
proceed. Nonetheless, reviewing our attempts to recast or translate the SCP 
into language consistent with what we perceived to be the interests of the 
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 As a non-BiH citizen, I would have been considered ‘international staff’ had I been 
salaried during this internship. This implies that I initially lacked intimate knowledge 
of the key structures and processes involved with governance in this context and more 
importantly, the social capital to acquire this knowledge without introductions 
provided by the Project Manager. 
  
European Commission as a prospective investor confirms an important and 
structurally coercive dimension to the relationship between liberal state-
building, nodal security governance and policing reforms in BiH.  
Our deliberations proceeded on the basis of imperfect information 
about what the European Commission would be interested in funding. This 
information was supplied by the Project Manager who suggested that we 
would need to identify a ‘selling point’ for Safer Communities that would 
readily answer the question of what these forums actually do. During one 
conversation that I had with the Project Manager, it was noted that Safer 
Communities projects in other transitional countries were linked with specific, 
topical issues designed to attract investment (Personal communication, 
‘Project Manager’, 17 February 2011).  In Kenya, for example, a ‘Safer Cities’ 
project had been implemented by UN-HABITAT which focused on the issue 
of developing safer housing. In Croatia, the UNDP ‘Safer Communities’ 
project stipulated that 20% of the project’s budget must be spent on gender 
related activities. By citing these previous examples, the Project Manager 
effectively suggested that the SCP in BiH would only appeal to donors if it 
was marketed as a strategy for achieving a clearly defined goal as opposed 
to marketing it as a template for improving security governance locally. In 
fact, the Project Manager went so far as to suggest that the European 
Commission would not view capacity development or the creation of new 
structures or nodes as ‘results’ in their own right. Rather, the Project 
Manager suggested that European-based donors were attracted to projects 
with tangible outputs; projects that could be measured and evaluated (Ibid.). 
 This mentality underpinned our search for a 'greater selling point’ and 
our efforts to demonstrate that the SCP could be aligned with what we 
identified as the European Commission’s agenda for Europeanization in BiH.  
One of the early concept notes that  that we produced indicated that CSF’s 
might provide a useful strategy for combatting rising levels of social exclusion 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina,  an issue which was previously identified as being 
significant by a 2009 UNDP Human Development Report for Bosnia-
Herzegovina (UNDP, 2009b). The possibility of linking this framework to the 
issue of refugees and returnees was also briefly discussed, albeit promptly 
dismissed once the Project Manager was informed by a senior UNDP 
manager based at the BiH country office that this was no longer an appealing 
issue for European donors (Personal communication, ‘Project Manager’, 14 
March 2011).  
The idea that the CSF’s could be marketed in relation to their 
projected contributions to reductions in local rates of crime and victimisation 
was also readily dismissed for methodological reasons. For one thing, the 
only available sources of baseline data describing levels of crime or 
  
victimisation and public perceptions of important institutions like the police 
came from police statistics or independently commissioned public 
perceptions surveys presenting inconsistent and at times questionable 
methodologies. Given the findings of the Safer Communities project’s own 
public perceptions survey, there was also a concern that the national 
expansion of Safer Communities might actually generate an initial increase in 
reported crime. This speculation was based on the belief that functional 
CSF’s would ideally generate greater awareness of public security issues 
within their respective communities and thereby encourage the public to 
become more proactive in reporting incidents to CSF members including the 
police. It was believed that the long term sustainability of the outputs 
generated by the Safer Communities project would be determined by the 
capacity of CSF members to address these heightened expectations of local 
public security provision. Thus, while the team was cautiously optimistic that 
these nodes would contribute to important, tangible improvements in the 
local governance of security if given the time to do so, it also recognised that 
the prospect of measuring and conveying their success in the short-term to 
donors was extremely problematic (Field notes, 14 February 2011).  
Having dismissed the possibility of branding Safer Communities as 
strategy for addressing crime or public perceptions of insecurity, our focus 
temporarily shifted to the prospect of aligning these projected outputs with 
the EU’s wider security interests in the region.  After reviewing the language 
of what we deemed to be important accession documents including the 
Copenhagen Criteria ‘that a candidate country must have achieved’ before it 
can become a member of the European Union (European Commission 2011) 
and Bosnia-Herzegovina’s ‘Stabilisation and Association Agreement’19, it was 
determined that the prospect of adapting the project to address the EU’s high 
profile security interests such as combatting organised crime and border 
security were rather limited. In this case, there was an intrinsic realisation 
amongst the team members that the Safer Communities concept would not 
have a direct impact on these issues, and more importantly, that it would be 
impossible to market this project impact to donors. While this deliberation 
process ultimately failed to provide us with a viable selling point, it did serve 
to prompt an important dialogue amongst the members of the SCP team 
which produced a consensus that the conceptual and programmatic contours 
of this project must continue to be oriented towards improving nodal 
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 As of March 2011, Bosnia and Herzegovina remains a potential candidate country for EU 
accession as it has not ratified its ‘Stabilisation and Association Agreement’ (SAA) 
which it signed back in June 2008. The SAA outlines the obligations that BiH must 
fulfil before it can be considered a candidate for EU membership.  
  
governance rather than increasing security (Personal communication, ‘Safer 
Communities team’, 25 March 2011).  
By April 2011, it was apparent that our concerted efforts to rebrand 
Safer Communities amounted to a significant distraction from the 
development and implementation of its actual project activities which had 
fallen behind schedule. The substantial time that was spent negotiating the 
conceptual aspects of the project and speculating about the interests of 
potential donors detracted from the attention which might have otherwise 
been devoted to actually managing relationships with CSF partners and even 
expanding the project through the project’s existing budgetary resources. 
This observation is informative insofar as it denotes a significant shift in the 
power politics of Safer Communities as a contact zone. This shift was 
indicative of the underlying power structures that have driven liberal state-
building initiatives in this context since 1996 (e.g. Chandler 1999).  
Whereas the implementation methodology that defined the SCP 
team’s mentality during the pilot stage compelled it to enhance the capacities 
of local public service providers to address the needs of their respective 
communities, the impending need to secure additional funding to sustain the 
project served to highlight the project’s susceptibility to the underlying power 
politics of nodal security governance in BiH as evident from these pressures 
for alignment.  This power shift was significant because it signalled that the 
preferences of domestic stakeholders including political elites, practitioners 
and the general public would ultimately have limited bearing on any 
decisions relating to the future of this project if it was defined in relation to 
European interests.  This was due to the fact that CSF members including 
democratically elected political elites, bureaucrats and senior practitioners in 
BiH were restricted from accessing this important contact zone because they 
lacked the economic or social capital to do so.  
The single observation which is most indicative of this assessment is 
that at no point during this three-month period did the Safer Communities 
team invite any BiH political elites to participate in this deliberation process. 
Rather, these local actors were structurally excluded from this translational 
process because they were unaware that it was taking place and they lacked 
an invitation from UNDP to participate. The inaccessibility of this contact 
zone is illustrated by the fact that its deliberative boundaries overlapped with 
the physical boundaries of the Safer Communities office which was located 
in UNDP’s BiH headquarters and featured a secure entry system and a strict 
visitor protocol.  
Illustrating the exclusion of these individuals is not to suggest that the 
Safer Communities team consciously or intentionally restricted these 
individuals from participating in this process.  Rather, it was simply the 
  
team’s assumption that CSF members and other government officials had 
little interest in participating in this translational process and that in all 
probability they had nothing to contribute to this task. This analysis is 
consistent with Maglajlić and Rašidagić’s (2007: 156) observation that 
‘Bosnian social-sector professionals [find] themselves both unable to 
communicate with international aid agencies and incapable of adopting the 
style of work these agencies brought with them.’ Rather, Maglajlić and 
Rašidagić (2007: 156) suggest that ‘local staff’ of international organisations 
like UNDP are the individuals who take on this function of policy translators 
or mediators and therefore have important role to play in linking transnational 
policy networks to local actors, institutions and governmental structures.  
Salvaging ((Safer Communities)) 
 
While the pressures for the SCP team to align this project with the interests 
of prospective donors presents a fatalistic assessment of the underlying 
structures of nodal security governance in BiH, recent developments since 
March 2011 indicate that the SCP team has potentially identified an 
alternative solution to this funding dilemma that promises to reaffirm its link to 
UNDP and allow it to govern the governance of security in accordance with 
its capacity development mandate. This solution is explainable from UNDP’s 
proximity to the SCP and this institution’s advocacy of managerial creativity 
as a means of achieving capacity development objectives amidst these 
financial pressures (Murphy 2006: 348). Creative problem solving in this 
instance was made possible by the fact that the UN development system 
continues to offer limited pockets of core funding which allows projects like 
SCP that are not particularly resource intensive to remain independent of 
non-core investment if they can be linked with designated funding areas 
(Brown 2011: 119).  In March 2011 the SCP team concluded that in order for 
the project to have a meaningful impact on the local governance of security 
in Bosnia-Hercegovina and for the CSF’s to be rendered locally accountable 
and sustainable the conceptual and programmatic prescriptions of this 
project would need to remain flexible. In other words, the ‘governance of 
governance’ (Wood and Shearing 2007) would need to be responsive to the 
diverse needs and expectations of the CSF partners rather than the rigid, 
subjective interests of supranational benefactors. Accordingly, the team 
determined that establishing and supporting the development of new 
municipal level CSF’s throughout BiH would necessarily serve as the 
project’s primary focus and projected output (Field notes, 25 March 2011).  
This realisation seemingly negated the possibility of attracting 
investment from the European Commission and following a series of 
  
meetings between the Safer Communities Project Manager and a senior 
UNDP manager based in the BiH country office who possessed significant 
contacts, experience and knowledge of the UN development system, the 
SCP developed a creative proposal to pursue the expansion of the Safer 
Communities project as a component of the UN’s Armed Conflict and 
Violence Prevention Programme (Personal communications, 14 March 
2011and 12 April 2011). This would enable the team to access additional 
core funding from UNDP’s Crisis Prevention and Recovery budget and to 
work alongside other UN development agencies like UN Population Fund to 
develop a range of project activities that could be marketed to and 
implemented through the CSFs. The idea was that CSF’s would still be 
afforded the opportunity to choose which project activities they wished to 
pursue while the Safer Communities team could provide technical and 
administrative support for these forums and draw upon its position in the 
network to connect these forums directly to appropriate donors (Personal 
communications, ‘Safer Communities team’, 13 December 2011 and 16 
February 2012). The benefit of this proposed solution (with reference to 
UNDP’s capacity development mandate) was that it promised to reduce the 
pressures for the SCP team to manage the project on the basis of 
anticipated ‘results’. It also suggests that the project’s contours will be 
defined, at least in part, by CSF members and other BiH political elites rather 
than supranational benefactors like the European Commission by proxy.  
As of June 2012, both the outcome of this proposal and the future of 
the Safer Communities project in Bosnia-Herzegovina remain uncertain.  
Even if the proposal is successful, changes in project personnel and the 
emergence of new security nodes (through prospective collaborations with 
UN agencies) may generate new pressures in this contact zone. It is also 
worth considering that the prospect of the SCP ultimately generating and 
sustaining local ownership of these CSFs is also questionable given 
domestic funding constraints and the lack of a domestic institution or actor 
which can provide these CSFs with continuous administrative support and a 
sense of interconnectedness once the SCP expires. After UNDP withdraws 
its support for the project, the SCP team anticipates that CSFs will actively 
seek out new sources of funding; a prospect which promises to generate 
new contact zones between these CSFs and new stakeholders which might 
lack an intrinsic appreciation for capacity building work (Field notes, 8-10 
February 2011). 
Important questions also exist about how the governance generated 
by these forums can be rendered publicly accountable and transparent. The 
documented presence of extensive political corruption in BiH (e.g. Divjak and 
Pugh 2008) and the enduring role of informal political networks as important 
  
sources of power and social capital in BiH (UNDP 2009b) poses an important 
question about the democratic character of the security outcomes that these 
CSFs may ultimately generate. 20  This echoes Johnston and Shearing’s 
(2003: 148) observation that local capacity building may potentially serve to 
advance the interests of the already powerful instead of the disempowered 
and that any outputs designed to empower local actors must therefore be 
rendered accountable to the public’s interest.  The task of developing a 
functional accountability mechanism to oversee the activities of these CSFs 
once UNDP has withdrawn its support for the SCP will therefore serve as the 
key determinant of whether the security outcomes generated by these nodes 




The prospect of securing additional non-core funding for the Safer 
Communities Project served to passively introduce a powerful new 
supranational stakeholder into this contact zone. The significant economic 
capital possessed by the European Commission enabled it to play an 
influential albeit indirect role in temporarily shaping the conceptual and 
programmatic contours of the project through a series of deliberations and 
negotiations that were conducted by the SCP team. This analysis is 
suggestive of a process of structural alignment and provides empirical 
illustration that supports the arguments of an established literature on liberal 
state-building and policing reform, particularly its discussion of the role that 
major international actors and donors play in generating structural alignment 
from a distance (Browne 2006; Duffield 2007). 
Aspects of this analysis appear rather fatalistic. Notably, the 
implication that projects like Safer Communities are structurally predisposed 
to the interests of external benefactors and stakeholders echoes concerns 
expressed by Bowling and Sheptycki (2012) regarding the legitimacy of 
global and transnational forms of policing while the sociological character of 
these pressures for alignment echoes Ryan’s (2011) Foucaultian analysis of 
policing reforms as a form of liberal governmentality. While these critiques do 
not preclude the prospect that domestic stakeholders may ultimately benefit 
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 Broader concerns about the politics of community safety partnerships and their 
exclusionary potential are well in research on this model in Western European contexts 
(eg. Crawford 1998).  
  
from the outputs generated by these policing reforms, they suggest that the 
governmental process is itself problematic due to its inaccessibility and lack 
of responsiveness to local interests. The example of Safer Communities 
highlights the fact that the power politics which underpin the work of multi-
lateral international development organisations in weak and structurally 
dependent societies like BiH is inevitably skewed towards supranational 
rather than domestic interests and this implies that the nodal cartography for 
security governance in these contexts is suggestive of a characterised by a 
democratic deficit with significant implications for the prospect of ultimately 
establishing locally accountable and democratically responsive security 
nodes (Johnston and Shearing 2003) that can independently govern security 
as a ‘public good’ (Loader and Walker 2003).      
While this case study supports this fatalistic analysis, it also presents 
a nuanced account of the relationship between liberal state-building and 
policing reforms, one which highlights the added benefit of exploring these 
power relations through a nodular framework. As Johnston and Shearing 
(original emphasis 2003: 146) suggest, governance cannot be reduced to 
‘the mere power of one agent over another’ but rather it exists as ‘a varying 
relationship between agents’.  A key implication of this nuanced analysis is 
therefore that security governance in weak and structurally dependent 
societies like BiH cannot simply be accounted for in hierarchical terms and 
so the presence of asymmetrical power structures, self-interested donors, 
and the myopic prescriptions of policy entrepreneurs need not translate into 
undemocratic policing outcomes (Ibid.: 147). Deconstructing the power 
politics that shaped Safer Communities as ‘the space between’ local CSFs in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina and supranational stakeholders highlights the dynamic 
character of governance within this nodal cartography and the value of using 
the concepts of ‘contact zones’ and ‘policy translation’ to shed light upon the 
ways that  seemingly disempowered actors and institutions to capitalise on 
their unique positioning in networks of governance to assert their preferences 
upon the contours of emergent contact zones like Safer Communities (Wood 
and Shearing 2007: 98).  
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